FAA NOTAM 6/4375 Bans Drones Near Federal Convoys, But Nobody Can See Where the Restrictions Are

A week-old FAA security notice has drone operators asking how they can comply with nationwide airspace restrictions they cannot see. NOTAM FDC 6/4375, issued January 16, 2026, prohibits all unmanned aircraft from flying within 3,000 feet laterally and 1,000 feet above any DOD, DOE, or DHS facility or mobile asset, including ground vehicle convoys and their escorts. The catch: there is no practical way for pilots to know where these moving restrictions are without the FAA revealing the exact positions of federal agents operating in American cities.

The Commercial Drone Alliance and security experts are now flagging the restrictions for operators, which extend the same “invisible no-fly zone” rules that previously applied only to Navy vessels to all federal mobile assets nationwide.

• NOTAM FDC 6/4375 creates a 3,000 ft lateral / 1,000 ft AGL buffer around all DOD, DOE, and DHS mobile assets, classified as “National Defense Airspace.”
• Part 107 pilots and Drone as First Responder programs could face criminal charges, certificate revocation, or drone destruction for violations.
• The FAA cannot map these restrictions on apps like B4UFLY without revealing federal agent positions.
• Full NOTAM text available at FAA NOTAM FDC 6/4375.

The 3,000-foot buffer raises questions for urban operations

NOTAM FDC 6/4375 extends drone flight restrictions to all DOD, DOE, and DHS facilities and mobile assets, including vessels, ground vehicle convoys, and their associated escorts such as USCG-operated vessels. The restriction prohibits all unmanned aircraft from flying within a stand-off distance of 3,000 feet laterally and 1,000 feet above these assets. The FAA classifies this airspace as “National Defense Airspace” under 49 U.S.C. Section 40103(B)(3).

Brandon Youngblood, a Domestic UAS Security and C-UAS Expert who has worked with the U.S. Government and industry, posted on LinkedIn that this NOTAM “essentially just shut down Minneapolis, and other cities airspace with federal agents dispersed throughout the city.” He raised a concern that affects DFR operators nationwide: “There is no way for the FAA to populate these restrictions on a map without highlighting the exact position of federal agents which would be a major OPSEC issue.”

The dimensions match the exact buffer zones applied to moving Naval vessels. But naval vessels are large, visible, and generally operate in waterways where drone pilots can spot them. Federal agents in unmarked vehicles moving through urban areas present a different challenge.

DFR programs face operational uncertainty

Drone as First Responder programs operate on rapid deployment. Programs like Glendale PD’s DFR system can have drones airborne and on-scene in 90 seconds. Victorville’s BRINC deployment promises 70-second response times. These programs launch without prior knowledge of every potential conflict in their flight path.

Youngblood pointed out that even public safety operators face exposure: “How is an operator, even public safety (law enforcement) drone as first responder (DFR), supposed to know where mobile federal units are? As a SLTT LE, they would be subject to the same civil and criminal penalties of violating a 14 CFR 99.7 SSI as any other operator without expressed approval by the FAA SOSC to enter such airspace.”

His observation: “Put into other words, if you see a federal agent via a drone, you’re more than likely violating national security airspace.”

Enforcement provisions include aircraft destruction authority

The NOTAM outlines multiple enforcement pathways. UAS operators who violate the restrictions may face criminal charges under 49 USC Section 46307. The FAA may pursue administrative action including civil penalties and certificate revocation under Title 49 USC Sections 44709 and 46301.

The NOTAM also references “mitigation” authority. UAS operators deemed to pose a credible safety or security threat to protected personnel, facilities, or assets “may be mitigated pursuant to 10 U.S.C. Section 130I, 6 U.S.C. Section 124N, and 50 U.S.C. Section 2661.” Mitigation, the NOTAM states, “may result in the interference, interception, seizure, damaging, or destruction of unmanned aircraft.”

Worth noting: maritime moving restrictions around USCG vessels have existed for years under similar authority. The FAA and federal agencies have generally not pursued aggressive enforcement against inadvertent, momentary violations by operators who were unaware of a vessel’s presence. Whether that same enforcement posture applies to urban mobile assets remains to be seen.

The Commercial Drone Alliance seeks clarity from regulators

The Commercial Drone Alliance posted about the NOTAM on LinkedIn, noting that the FAA updated its nationwide restriction earlier this month. They confirmed that drones are now prohibited from operating 3,000 ft laterally / 1,000 ft AGL of DOD, DOE, and DHS facilities and mobile assets, including vessels and ground vehicle convoys and their associated escorts.

The CDA noted that noncompliance “may result in criminal or civil enforcement, loss of operating authority, and potential UAS mitigation actions.” They added that the organization is “inquiring with federal regulators to ensure authorized commercial and public safety drone operators have the information they need to remain compliant.”

The FAA directs operators needing to fly in affected airspace to coordinate in advance with the appropriate DOD, DHS, DOJ, DOE, or USCG entity, or to contact the FAA System Operations Support Center (SOSC) at (202) 267-8276. Points of contact for specific facilities and mobile assets may be available on the FAA’s UDDS website.

NOTAM FDC 6/4375 replaces previous security notice with expanded scope

NOTAM FDC 6/4375 explicitly replaces the previous NOTAM FDC 5/6378. The authority comes from 14 CFR Section 99.7, which allows the FAA to issue Special Security Instructions for specific airspace. The NOTAM was issued on January 16, 2026, at 1906 UTC.

The expansion to mobile assets nationwide follows a pattern of increasing restrictions around federal operations. Last October, the FAA issued what journalism groups called the “largest drone ban ever” over Chicago, a 935-square-mile TFR that grounded civilian drone pilots while federal agencies conducted operations. That restriction sparked concerns about press freedom and surveillance double standards.

Youngblood’s recommendation to the FAA: “My recommendation would be to scale down the dimensions to take into consideration the limited knowledge of where federal ground agents are and limited visibility of the urban environment. There is a balance that can be struck here, and this misses the mark by a wide margin.”

DroneXL’s Take

I’ve tracked FAA airspace restrictions for nearly a decade, and this NOTAM sits in an awkward middle ground. The 3,000-foot buffer made sense for ships. Large gray vessels with hull numbers are visible from a distance. Federal vehicles in urban traffic are not.

But let me offer some perspective before we all panic. Maritime moving restrictions have been in place for years, and the commercial drone industry has not collapsed. The FAA and federal agencies have shown restraint in enforcement against genuinely accidental encounters. A Part 107 pilot flying a roof inspection who briefly enters an invisible zone around a passing convoy is unlikely to face the full weight of criminal prosecution, assuming they were not deliberately hovering over the vehicles or interfering with operations.

That said, the practical effect may be exactly what DHS wants: uncertainty that encourages conservative flight behavior. If you do not know where the invisible zones are, you fly more carefully in areas where federal activity is plausible. That is a feature, not a bug, from the security perspective.

The real question is how this affects DFR programs. Agencies from Oceanside to Newport Beach to Concord are deploying rapid-response drones that need to launch without pre-flight coordination for every possible airspace conflict. I expect DFR vendors will start building federal coordination protocols into their operational frameworks within the next six months. The alternative is that legitimate emergency response operations get chilled by legal uncertainty, and nobody benefits from that outcome.

The CDA is asking the right questions. We will follow their inquiry with federal regulators and report back when we have more clarity on how these rules apply to public safety and commercial operators in practice.

What do you think about these new restrictions? Share your thoughts in the comments below.

Editorial Note: This article was researched and drafted with the assistance of AI to ensure technical accuracy and archive retrieval. All insights, industry analysis, and perspectives were provided exclusively by Haye Kesteloo and our other DroneXL authors, editors, and YouTube partners to ensure the “Human-First” perspective our readers expect.

Last update on 2026-01-23 / Affiliate links / Images from Amazon Product Advertising API