U.S. Army Scraps $1 Billion Tank, Bets on Consumer Drones After Experimental Brigade Triples Kill Rate

The U.S. Army is canceling billions of dollars in traditional weapons programs and replacing them with commercial-style drones after an experimental brigade achieved three times the normal enemy kill rate using tactics borrowed directly from Ukraine’s drone revolution.

Col. Joshua Glonek’s 3,500-soldier brigade from the 10th Mountain Division killed three times as many enemy fighters as typical units during an 11-day winter training exercise in Germany, according to senior Army officials. The dramatic results came after the Army equipped his unit with approximately 150 drones and dozens of loitering munitions—the same consumer-grade technology dominating battlefields in Ukraine.

How Commercial Drones Tripled Combat Effectiveness

During the February training exercise at a U.S. Army base in Germany, Glonek’s brigade used inexpensive reconnaissance drones to spot roughly two dozen enemy vehicles hiding under trees. Within 10 minutes, his artillery battalion aimed all cannons at the target. A volley of about 144 simulated artillery rounds followed, enough to destroy most of the vehicles.

The results impressed Gen. Randy George, the Army’s chief of staff, who touted the brigade’s success to Congress. The training demonstrated that Army formations were “capable of rapidly improving their lethality,” he told lawmakers, according to the NY Times.

But the real story goes deeper. The exercise revealed that about 90% of the brigade’s fire missions began with a drone finding the enemy and monitoring the kill. “We had more targets than we had assets to shoot them, just because the drones were so much more capable,” Glonek said.

$1 Billion Tank Canceled Over $500 Drone Threat

The drone success is forcing unprecedented budget cuts. Gen. George eliminated the M-10 Booker light tank after spending more than $1 billion developing it. The reason? Military planners concluded it could be easily destroyed by a $500 to $1,000 kamikaze drone.

The Army also slashed its Joint Light Tactical Vehicle order from 50,000 units to just 18,000. The 7-ton armored troop carrier was designed to survive roadside bombs in Iraq and Afghanistan, but makes less sense in drone-dominated warfare.

Savings are being redirected to the Infantry Squad Vehicle—a dune-buggy-style troop carrier with nine seats, an engine, and roll bars. Instead of armor, it relies on speed and ability to move under tree cover to evade drone attacks.

Soldiers Hallucinating From Drone Workload

The new drone-heavy formations revealed serious challenges. Staff Sgt. Dakota Ireland, 29, recalled going four days with almost no sleep during the Germany exercise. “I was actively hallucinating,” he said, imagining enemy fighters attacking his vehicle.

Glonek created three new 80-soldier “Strike” companies armed with medium-range drones, loitering munitions, and mortars. These units became his most efficient killers but faced exhaustion managing torrents of information from drone feeds while securing two-person flight teams—high-value targets for enemy forces.

Drone batteries struggled in cold weather, forcing sergeants to warm them using vehicle exhaust. “Priority one was to use the drones,” said Sgt. Benjamin Simma, 24. “Priority two was to recharge the batteries so we could keep using the drones.”

Ukraine’s Battlefield Reality Comes to U.S. Army

The transformation stems directly from Ukraine’s experience. A Ukrainian Army officer recently explained to an American counterpart what fighting on a drone-swarming battlefield feels like. “Everything wants to destroy you,” Lt. Col. Volodymyr Dutko told his U.S. counterpart for a Center for Strategic and International Studies study.

Gen. George launched “transformation in contact” brigades last year to bypass the Pentagon’s slow acquisition process. Three brigades—including units from the 101st Airborne Division and 10th Mountain Division—received authority to experiment with commercial drones, AI-enabled targeting, and electronic warfare systems.

One experimental brigade bought 250 cheap computer boards programmed to emit false signals resembling headquarters emitters. The goal: flood the battlefield with decoys and disappear in electronic clutter.

Glonek took deception further by contracting with a Czech company for three inflatable artillery cannons paired with electronic emitters—similar to Ukrainian tactics against Russia. During training, the opposition force fired at the fakes three times, exposing their real cannon positions. Glonek’s troops immediately destroyed all three enemy guns.

Congress Demands Answers on Rapid Changes

Not everyone supports the speed of transformation. Representative Mike D. Rogers, Republican of Alabama and chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, pressed Gen. George for a traditional long-term acquisition plan. “We need to see your homework,” Rogers said this summer.

Gen. George didn’t have that kind of plan. Such an approach is too rigid and slow when drone technology evolves weekly, he believes. The Army proposed eliminating the Gray Eagle long-range drone, which requires more than 100 soldiers to operate and needs runway infrastructure. Today’s commercial drones can be flown by two soldiers.

Some former Army officials criticized George’s approach as too reliant on unproven technology. “We’re building formations that we know are fragile,” said Maj. Gen. Patrick Donahoe, who helped develop Army modernization plans a decade ago and is now retired. “That’s a really risky bet that gets paid in blood.”

Reality Check at Fort Polk: Heat Defeats Thermal Cameras

Hot August morning training at Fort Polk, Louisiana revealed drone limitations. The Ghost-X drone—with roughly 7 miles (11 km) of range—easily spotted warm bodies using thermal cameras during cold German winters. But at 95°F (35°C), everything glowed white-hot on thermal displays.

Scout teams hiding under camouflage netting taunted drone operators by text. “You ain’t gonna find us all,” one scout messaged First Lt. Lauren Little, the 23-year-old drone platoon leader.

After more than an hour of searching, Little’s team found three of four scout positions. “Three out of four isn’t bad,” said Capt. Thomas Roberts, 29, the company commander. “Obviously, I want four of four. But if they had found everyone, then I would wonder what my scouts were doing.”

The psychological impact concerns military experts. “I don’t think the reality of what drones mean on the battlefield has really sunk in for the U.S. Army,” said Lt. Gen. David W. Barno, a retired former commander in Afghanistan. “We certainly haven’t encountered the psychological impact of having a machine looking at you all the time that’s devoted to killing you.”

DroneXL’s Take

The U.S. Army just admitted what DroneXL readers have known for years: consumer drone technology has fundamentally changed warfare. When a $500 FPV kamikaze drone can destroy a $10 million light tank, traditional military thinking collapses.

We’ve been covering Ukraine’s million-drone revolution and the U.S. military’s scramble to catch up. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s July 2025 directive targeting “drone dominance by 2027” now makes perfect sense given these training results. The Army is literally betting soldiers’ lives that commercial drone innovation can outpace traditional defense contractors.

But this transformation raises uncomfortable questions. If Staff Sgt. Ireland is hallucinating after four days of managing drone feeds during training, what happens during actual combat? The Army’s solution—creating specialized Strike companies—might just be shifting the exhaustion burden rather than solving it.

The bureaucratic battle is equally concerning. Congress wants traditional procurement timelines while Gen. George argues drone technology evolves weekly. He’s right that Pentagon acquisition moves at glacier speed compared to Ukrainian manufacturers iterating drone designs between missions. But Rogers has a point too: rapidly fielding unproven systems to 32 brigades could leave critical capability gaps.

What’s clear is that the commercial drone industry—from DJI’s dominance in reconnaissance to FPV racing culture enabling kamikaze tactics—has forced the world’s largest military to completely rethink modern warfare. The Army’s “Amazon for drones” marketplace and contracts with companies like Draganfly for forward-deployed manufacturing show they’re finally taking Ukraine’s lessons seriously.

The real test comes when these experimental brigades face actual combat. Training center victories mean nothing if thermal cameras fail in desert heat or soldiers collapse from cognitive overload. Gen. George is making the right bet on drones, but the Army’s ability to manage the human cost of this technology revolution remains unproven.

What do you think? Share your thoughts in the comments below.