EU’s Drone Defense Plan Sidelines Ukraine’s Proven Manufacturing Edge, Analyst Warns

The European Union’s ambitious drone defense roadmap is taking the wrong approach by limiting cooperation to EU-only initiatives rather than leveraging NATO structures and Ukraine’s battle-tested manufacturing capabilities, according to a Reuters Breakingviews analysis published today.

Pierre Briancon, a Reuters Breakingviews columnist covering European business and economics, argues that Brussels’ recently proposed “Defence Readiness Roadmap” fundamentally misunderstands how to build effective drone defense against Russian aggression. The critique comes as the EU fast-tracks its European Drone Defence Initiative following repeated Russian drone incursions into NATO airspace.

EU Roadmap Limits Defense to Bloc Members

The European Commission’s Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030, officially presented October 16, proposes four flagship defense projects including the European Drone Defence Initiative. However, Briancon contends the EU is “courting the risk of mission creep by suggesting – even in the vaguest of terms – a joint defence policy.”

“The EU is not the proper forum to do so,” Briancon writes, noting that some member states like Ireland and Austria maintain formal neutrality, while others including Spain feel geographically distant from potential Russian threats. “The ‘coalition of the willing’ once mentioned by UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer should be the natural forum for joint initiatives,” he argues.

The coalition of the willing, announced by Starmer at a March 2025 London summit, has assembled at least 30 countries prepared to provide security guarantees for Ukraine and coordinate defense efforts outside traditional EU structures. The UK and France lead the coalition, which includes NATO members with substantial military capabilities naturally suited for countering Russian aggression.

Eastern European Nations Bear Disproportionate Costs

Briancon’s analysis highlights a critical financial imbalance that the EU’s approach fails to address. The seven EU countries closest to Russia—Poland, Romania, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, Latvia, and Estonia—collectively spend approximately €65 billion ($69 billion USD) on defense this year, according to NATO estimates. Their military spending varies dramatically based on perceived threat levels, from Hungary’s 2% of GDP to Poland’s 5%.

Yet these frontline states would bear the brunt of any conflict. “If the bloc collectively spent the equivalent of what Ukraine does on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) – about 2% of Kyiv’s military budget, according to defence analyst Olena Kryzhanivska – that would mean about 1.3 billion euros to spend on drones,” Briancon notes. “That spending should at least be fully mutualised via joint EU borrowing – while the Seven would be at the frontline of hostilities, a conflict would be a problem for all 27 states.”

The roadmap provides no mechanism for this financial solidarity, leaving eastern European nations to shoulder disproportionate defense costs despite defending the entire bloc’s borders.

Ukraine’s Manufacturing Capacity Overlooked

Most critically, Briancon argues, the EU approach fails to capitalize on Ukraine’s extraordinary drone manufacturing transformation. Ukraine has evolved from producing just 5,000 drones in 2022 to a current capacity of 4 million drones annually, with over 500 manufacturers operating across the country.

“Finally, the approach should more systematically tap Ukraine’s expertise,” Briancon writes. “The country has become the main provider of UAVs in Europe, with about 100 drone-making firms and nearly 50 more devising UAV software. Kyiv produces 4 million drones annually but could make twice as much with proper funding, according to Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskiy.”

Briancon notes that increased funding could enable Ukraine not only to better defend itself but also “generate revenue by selling its battle-hardened drones to its neighbours. The ‘coalition of the willing’ could see this as a good opportunity to show what it exactly wills.”

DroneXL’s Take

This Reuters analysis crystallizes a tension we’ve been tracking throughout 2025: the gap between Europe’s bureaucratic defense planning and Ukraine’s demonstrated battlefield innovation.

The numbers tell a stark story. While EU officials debate jurisdictional control over drone defense initiatives, Ukraine deploys 9,000 drones daily—consuming 270,000 drones monthly in actual combat operations. That’s more drones consumed in a single month than many European nations plan to procure in years.

We’ve documented how this battlefield necessity has driven Ukraine’s remarkable transformation. Our October coverage showed how Ukraine has become NATO’s drone warfare teacher, with Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen bluntly stating that:

“the only expert right now in the world when it comes to anti-drone capacities is Ukraine, because they are fighting the Russian drones almost every day.”

The EU committed €6 billion ($7 billion USD) to scale Ukrainian drone production in October, but Briancon’s critique exposes a deeper problem: routing this funding through EU-only structures may dilute exactly what makes Ukrainian drone manufacturing so effective—the rapid iteration cycle driven by real-time battlefield feedback.

Denmark has already demonstrated the superior model. By channeling funds directly to Ukrainian manufacturers while establishing protected co-production facilities, Denmark exploits Ukraine’s speed advantage and battlefield-proven designs. The Netherlands followed with a €200 million joint production partnership in October, recognizing that Ukrainian drone designs forged under daily combat pressure deliver better performance per dollar than traditional Western defense systems.

The UK’s Project OCTOPUS is mass-producing Ukrainian-designed interceptor drones at a fraction of Western contractor costs—drones that destroy $35,000 Russian Shaheds for just $2,500 each. These aren’t theoretical systems awaiting years of testing. They’re combat-proven platforms destroying Russian drones over Ukrainian cities every night.

Briancon’s point about financial solidarity mechanisms is equally critical. Poland alone spent over €40 billion on defense in 2024, while simultaneously hosting Ukrainian refugees and serving as a primary logistics corridor for Western military aid. The EU’s failure to create burden-sharing mechanisms for frontline states undermines the collective security the bloc claims to pursue.

The irony is hard to miss. Europe spent years trying to bring Ukraine up to NATO standards through training programs. The brutal reality of 9,000 drones daily has completely flipped that relationship. Now Ukraine trains Danish forces, exports battle-tested designs to NATO allies, and demonstrates innovation cycles that have lapped Western procurement systems by years.

As we’ve covered the EU’s expanding drone wall initiative—now extended to 360-degree coverage of all EU borders—the fundamental question remains: Will Europe learn from Ukraine’s model of rapid iteration and direct manufacturer funding, or will bureaucratic structures slow deployment of the very technologies Ukraine has already proven work?

The “coalition of the willing” that Briancon endorses offers a more nimble alternative. Operating outside EU institutional constraints, it can channel resources directly to Ukrainian manufacturers, establish co-production partnerships that protect against Russian strikes, and integrate combat-proven systems into NATO defense networks without years of bureaucratic review.

What do you think? Should Europe prioritize Ukrainian manufacturers who’ve proven battlefield success, or spread contracts through traditional EU defense suppliers? Share your thoughts in the comments below.

Last update on 2026-01-28 / Affiliate links / Images from Amazon Product Advertising API