South Africa Investigates How Civilian Laser Sensors Ended Up in Russian Attack Drones

South African authorities are investigating how laser range finders manufactured by Pretoria-based Lightware Optoelectronics ended up in Russian Garpiya-A1 suicide drones attacking Ukraine. The discovery adds a new dimension to the growing problem of Western and civilian components being weaponized in Russia’s drone arsenal.

This marks the first time an African manufacturer has been linked to Russia’s drone supply chain, raising questions about export control enforcement and the ease with which civilian technology can be diverted to military applications.

How the Discovery Was Made

Ukrainian special envoy for sanctions Vladyslav Vlasiuk identified the Lightware components in August 2025 after examining downed Russian drones. The laser range finder can measure distances and trigger detonation in the Garpiya-A1 long-range attack drone, which has a maximum range of 932 miles (1,500 kilometers) and a takeoff weight under 661 pounds (300 kilograms).

Ukraine’s intelligence services subsequently listed the Lightware SF-20 range finder among foreign components discovered in Russian drones via their Telegram channel. Vlasiuk’s August post specifically identified the SF-20/B model, which Lightware CEO Nadia Nilsen confirmed was discontinued in 2020. The company currently sells the SF-20/C model for $279 on its website.

Lightware’s Response and Export Controls

Lightware said it’s unclear how Russia obtained the equipment, which isn’t designed for military use.

“It appears an unscrupulous operator, without our knowledge, purchased our sensors elsewhere and used them unlawfully in Russia,” Nilsen told Bloomberg via email.

The company, founded in 2011, manufactures sensors for civilian applications including driverless cars, wildlife monitoring, and mining automation. Lightware stopped selling to Russia and Ukraine when the conflict escalated in 2022, but cannot track sensor use after distributors make sales.

“We use end-user declarations to control where and to whom our products are sold,” Nilsen explained. “We are sadly unable to regulate how this sensor can be applied downstream.”

Under South African law, companies are prohibited from exporting arms to countries in active conflict without permission from the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC). Lightware maintains its products are civilian-only and don’t require NCACC permits.

Sipho Mashaba, the NCACC’s acting director for conventional arms control, confirmed an investigation is underway.

“The entity in question is not registered to trade with munitions and dual-use goods and technologies,” Mashaba said in an emailed response. “This matter will be referred to the inspectors who will visit the premises of the entity to establish the scope of their business as well as the application.”

The Garpiya Drone Connection

The Garpiya series represents Russia’s push to produce long-range attack drones using Chinese engines and technology. IEMZ Kupol, a subsidiary of Russian state weapons maker Almaz-Antey, produced more than 2,500 Garpiya drones between July 2023 and July 2024, according to intelligence documents reviewed by Reuters.

These drones, modeled on Iran’s Shahed-136 design, are deployed at a rate of approximately 500 per month against Ukrainian military and civilian targets. The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned Chinese companies in October 2024 for supplying Garpiya components, marking the first sanctions on entities directly developing complete weapons systems for Russia.

The Lightware discovery comes just days after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky disclosed that Russian weapons used in an October 5 attack contained more than 100,000 foreign-made components from U.S., European, and Asian manufacturers.

South Africa’s Geopolitical Dilemma

The investigation arrives at a sensitive time for South African-U.S. relations. President Cyril Ramaphosa’s government is navigating fallout from the Trump administration’s 30% tariffs on South African exports, imposed in April 2025 as part of broader “reciprocal tariff” policies.

Trump has criticized South Africa’s neutral stance on the Ukraine conflict and its close ties to Russia and China. In February 2023, the U.S. accused South Africa of shipping arms to Russia aboard the sanctioned vessel Lady R, though a judicial probe found no evidence substantiating the claims.

Lightware has attracted investment from Johannesburg-based Sanari Capital, which invested 25 million rand ($1.5 million) in the company in 2020.

“We are profoundly disturbed to learn that one of the technologies we support has been found in such a nefarious application,” said Samantha Pokroy, Sanari Capital’s CEO. “It is deeply unfortunate that component manufacturers lack the means to fully trace the end use of their products.”

With the discovery of drone parts, “certain people are going to jump up and down,” said Helmoed-Roemer Heitman, a Cape Town-based military analyst. “It is embarrassing. It’s a murky sort of area.”

DroneXL’s Take

The Lightware case perfectly illustrates a problem we’ve been tracking for months: Russia’s ability to source drone components through complex, often opaque supply chains despite international sanctions. While Lightware appears to have taken reasonable precautions by embargoing Russia and Ukraine in 2022, the sensors still reached Russian military drones through intermediaries.

This isn’t just about one South African company. It’s about the fundamental challenge of controlling dual-use technology in an interconnected global economy. Laser range finders designed for precision landing and obstacle avoidance in civilian drones are easily weaponized. The same sensor that helps a survey drone avoid trees can help a Garpiya calculate the perfect detonation height over a target.

The timing couldn’t be worse for South Africa’s already strained relationship with Washington. With Trump tariffs biting and U.S.-South Africa relations at their lowest point since apartheid, this discovery hands critics more ammunition. Whether fair or not, Pretoria will face pressure to demonstrate it’s serious about preventing technology transfers to Russia—even when those transfers happen through third parties beyond direct government control.

The bigger question: How many other “civilian” component manufacturers worldwide are unknowingly (or knowingly) feeding Russia’s drone production machine? Ukraine’s recent disclosure of 100,000+ Western parts in Russian weapons suggests the Lightware case is just one small piece of a much larger enforcement failure.

What do you think? Share your thoughts in the comments below.