Pentagon Laser Shoots Down CBP Drone Near El Paso, Exposing a Deeper Government Coordination Failure

The Department of Defense used a high-energy laser to destroy a U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) drone over Fort Hancock, Texas on Thursday, February 26, according to four officials who spoke to The New York Times. The FAA responded by shutting down airspace below 18,000 feet over the area and Democratic lawmakers immediately called for an Inspector General investigation. The reason the drone was shot down: CBP had not told the Pentagon it was flying one. The military saw an unknown aircraft and fired.

This is the second time in two weeks the same failure has played out near El Paso. On February 11, the same laser system shot down metallic balloons during operations near Fort Bliss — and the FAA shut down El Paso International Airport for roughly eight hours, canceling 14 flights and diverting medical evacuations 45 miles to Las Cruces. We covered that incident in depth and noted then that the coordination failures had not been fixed. They weren’t.

Key facts from Thursday’s incident:

• The incident: The Pentagon used a directed-energy weapon to destroy a DHS/CBP drone near Fort Hancock, TX — a small border town about 55 miles southeast of El Paso — on Thursday, February 26.
• The cause: CBP had not notified the Pentagon it was flying a drone in that area. Military operators identified an unknown aircraft and engaged it.
• The FAA response: The agency issued a new flight restriction barring aircraft below 18,000 feet over Fort Hancock, citing “special security reasons.” The restriction extends to late June, though it may be lifted earlier.
• The legal question: Federal law requires the Pentagon to “coordinate” with the FAA and the Department of Transportation before deploying systems that could affect civilian aviation. That coordination did not happen — again.

The Pentagon and FAA Are Operating Without a Common Picture

Thursday’s incident near Fort Hancock confirms what the February 11 El Paso closure already made obvious: there is no reliable interagency communication system for counter-drone operations along the southern border. The Pentagon shot down a CBP drone because CBP didn’t file a flight notice. The FAA found out after the fact and restricted airspace. None of the agencies involved had a shared operational picture in real time.

A Pentagon official told the Times that a preliminary internal report concluded CBP had not notified the Defense Department it was launching a drone. The agencies released a joint statement Thursday night, claiming they are “working together in an unprecedented fashion.” It described the engagement as occurring when “the Department of War employed counter-unmanned aircraft system authorities to mitigate a seemingly threatening unmanned aerial system operating within military airspace” — language that makes shooting down your own government’s drone sound like a planned procedure rather than a mistake.

At a Senate confirmation hearing Thursday, Pentagon nominee Mark Ditlevson was pressed by lawmakers to explain why the Defense Department had allowed lasers to fire in El Paso airspace earlier this month over FAA objections. He told senators the statutory requirement is to “coordinate” with the FAA — not obtain approval. Senator Jack Reed of Rhode Island cut him off. “The coordination failed,” Reed said.

Democrats Demand an Inspector General Investigation

Senator Tammy Duckworth of Illinois, the ranking Democrat on the Senate aviation subcommittee, announced she will request a joint Inspector General investigation into both laser incidents from the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and Transportation. Representatives Rick Larsen, Andre Carson, and Bennie Thompson — the top Democrats on panels overseeing aviation and homeland security — issued a joint statement saying their “heads are exploding” and pointing to pending legislation that would improve counter-drone coordination and operator training.

This is not the first time Larsen and Thompson have sounded this alarm. In April 2025, the same two representatives raised the issue after Secret Service counter-drone technology near Reagan National Airport triggered false collision avoidance alerts on commercial aircraft — again without FAA coordination. The pattern repeats: a federal agency fires up counter-drone technology without notifying the FAA, something breaks, and Congress asks what happened.

The cartel drone threat driving all of this is real. A DHS counter-drone official told Congress last year that hostile organizations had flown about 27,000 drones within 500 meters of the border in the first half of 2024 alone. The Pentagon’s push to deploy high-energy lasers at the border is a direct response to a genuine and growing problem. But responding to a threat requires knowing which aircraft in your airspace are yours.

It’s also worth noting the timing. Just two days before this incident, the Pentagon’s Joint Interagency Task Force 401 — which leads national counter-drone efforts — launched a new counter-UAS procurement marketplace designed to get more validated systems into the hands of operators faster. The ambition is real. The deconfliction infrastructure to support it clearly isn’t ready.

DroneXL’s Take

I’ve been covering the counter-drone policy situation for years, and what keeps happening near El Paso is the same failure I wrote about after the Reagan National incident, and again in our February 22 weekly roundup that revisited the balloon shootdown story. Every time, the federal response is “we’re working on coordination.” Every time, the coordination fails in a way that grounds airports, destroys government property, or nearly causes a mid-air collision.

What makes Thursday’s incident different from the balloon shootdown is the target. When lasers took out metallic balloons, you could argue the identification technology was immature. This time, the laser destroyed an aircraft belonging to another U.S. government agency. That’s not a sensor calibration problem. That’s a deconfliction process that simply doesn’t exist.

Defense Secretary Hegseth issued his “drone dominance by 2027” directive last summer. The administration has been aggressive about deploying counter-drone systems at the border, at stadiums, and around critical infrastructure. But you can’t have drone dominance if you can’t tell the difference between your own drones and a threat. The weapon is being built faster than the command structure to use it safely.

Expect the Fort Hancock airspace restriction to be quietly lifted well before its late June expiration — the same way the El Paso closure evaporated hours after the White House found out about it. But the underlying coordination failure will remain unresolved. The IG investigation Duckworth is requesting will take months. By the time results come back, there will probably be a third incident.

Editorial Note: AI tools were used to assist with research and archive retrieval for this article. All reporting, analysis, and editorial perspectives are by Haye Kesteloo.